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Abstract 
The chance (or ‘probability’) of a dam failure can change for various reasons such as 
structural degradation, the impacts of climate change and land-use change. Similarly the 
consequences of dam failure (flooding) can change for many reasons such as growth in the 
population in areas below a dam.  Consequently both the chance that a dam might fail and the 
likely consequences of that failure can change over time. It is therefore crucial that reservoir 
safety risk analysis methods and decision-making processes are able to support (as a 
minimum) ‘what-if’ testing (or ‘sensitivity testing’) to take into account these changes over 
time to gauge their effect on the estimated risk of dam failure. The consequences of a dam 
failure relate to the vulnerability and exposure of the receptors (for example, people, property 
and environment) to floodwater. Also the probability of dam failure varies with age, design 
and construction of the dam. 
Spillway failure may be caused by the dissipation of energy from water flowing down the 
spillway, and embankment erosion (scour) may be caused by a dam overtopping. The 
occurrence of these events depends upon the dam design and the likelihood of extreme 
rainfall, also in the case of overtopping wind-driven waves on the reservoir surface. In this 
study the meteorological situations of notable recent events i.e. the Boltby, North Yorkshire 
incident, 19 June 2005 in which the dam almost overtopped, and the spillway failure of the 
Ulley Dam near Rotherham at the end of June 2007, are studied. The WRF numerical model 
will be used to indicate how these meteorological situations might be maximized, and be 
coupled with the occurrence of other failure modes such as the likelihood of internal dam 
failure assessed from previous work by government panel engineers. 
Keywords: dam, internal failure, winds, snow, drought, numerical model 
1. Introduction 
 The chance of a flood occurring downstream of the reservoir is based on consideration of the 
source of the threat (for example, an extreme rainfall event, internal erosion of the dam or 
earthquake), the performance or ‘response’ of the reservoir and dam when that threat occurs, 
and the nature of the downstream valley (the so-called pathway of risk). The consequences of 
a dam failure relate to the vulnerability and exposure of the receptors (for example, people, 
property and environment) to floodwater. Also the probability of dam failure varies with age, 
design and construction of the dam. There have been at least 41 safety problems at dams in 
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England and Wales over the past six years (to December 2013), including 14 serious 
incidents. 
Although there have been no failures resulting in loss of life in the UK since 1925, it has been 
suggested by Atkins (2013) that the UK has been fortunate and lucky. There have been many 
failures of what are known as ‘small raised reservoirs’ (SRRs) (up to a volume of 25,000 m3) 
and many incidents. Flood events, particularly in 2007, showed that many SRRs were not 
maintained properly, or operated properly and that the risks posed by them were significant. 
This was recognised by Pitt (2008) who recommended a move to a risk based system and a 
move to include SRRs. Large reservoirs (reservoirs greater than 25,000 m
3
) were required to 
be registered under the UK Reservoirs Act 1975, whereas  the Flood and Water Management 
Act 2010 changed this such that a reservoir will now be considered: “large" if it is capable of 
holding 10,000 m
3 
(as opposed to 25,000 m
3
) of water or more; and "raised" if it is capable of 
holding water above the natural level of any part of the surrounding land.  
The modes of dam failure include surface and internal erosion, crest fissuring, spillway 
breakup, a blocked overflow, collapse of outlet pipes and controlled holding of water at a low 
level. These problems may be related to the structure of the dam for example whether it is 
clay filled or not, subjected to long-term drought conditions, or extensive freezing and 
thawing. Spillway failure may be caused by the dissipation of energy from water flowing 
down the spillway, and embankment erosion (scour) may be caused by a dam overtopping. 
The occurrence of these events depends upon the dam design and the likelihood of extreme 
rainfall, also in the case of overtopping wind-driven waves on the reservoir surface. It is 
crucial that reservoir safety risk analysis methods and decision-making processes are able to 
support (as a minimum) ‘what-if’ testing (or ‘sensitivity testing’) to take into account these 
changes over time to gauge their effect on the estimated risk of dam failure. 
 
A dam failure can result in local loss of life or damage to property. The consequences are not 
likely to be on a national scale, although the consequences can occur on a regional scale. A 
recent example is the Boltby, North Yorkshire incident, 19 June 2005 in which the dam 
almost overtopped. The dam was built in the 1880's and is located 1.5 km upstream of the 
village of Boltby. It is an approximately 150m long and 20m high earth-fill. The spillway 
consisted of a weir on the east side of the dam which leads to a masonry spillway channel. 
Since it is situated upstream of Boltby it is designated a category A dam (see later), such that 
the spillway must safely pass the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) criterion. A raingauge 
reading taken at Hawnby, about 5km to the ENE of the dam, gave 64mm occurring in just 
over an hour with 125 mm falling in three hours, but the reading at Thirlby was lost as the 
gauge was overwhelmed. In this incident a temporary camp site at Duncombe Park near 
Helmsley in North Yorkshire was evacuated (Wass et al., 2008). Had the storm occurred 24 
hours earlier and the dam failed completely 10,000 people sheltering in tents attending a rally 
would have occupied the site and been at risk. The flood occurred on rivers which had not 
experienced serious flooding in living memory. 
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An earthquake may cause a dam failure either directly, or through a concommitant landslip 
into the reservoir causing a large wave which overtops the dam. Such events have not 
occurred in the UK to date, but have occurred elsewhere. On October 9th, 1963 when the 
reservoir behind the Vajont Dam in Italy was being filled a section of rock weighing 150 
million tonnes fell from the face of the nearby Monte Toc into the water. A huge swell 
occurred washing away several towns above the dam, while a second wave overtopped the 
Dam into the valley below, killing around 2,000 people and everything in its path. 
 
In this paper we discuss the concurrent risks of a dam failure from a statistical point of view. 
However, this analysis is dependent upon knowledge of the probability of failure due to the 
likelihood that specific conditions occur. Of particular importance is rainfall approaching the 
design Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). We examine this for one case using an 
atmospheric numerical model in order to indicate an approach to estimating the statistical 
likelihood of occurrence of such extreme rainfall. 
 
2. Classification of dams in the UK 
 
Reservoir owners, operators and uses are responsible for making sure that their reservoirs 
operate safely and are properly managed. Reservoirs are classified on a consequence of 
failure basis as shown in Table 1. Figure 1a shows the distribution of Category A and B in 
England and Wales, and Figure 1b is an example from the Environment Agency Web site of 
the area likely to be flooded should dams fail near Pontefract, Yorkshire. Similar maps may 
be produced throughout England and Wales.  
 
 However, the high water level downstream of the Ulley reservoir located in Yorkshire during 
the event of 24-25 June 2007, and the threat of the dam failure, resulted in the closure of the 
M1 motorway for 40 hours, and the evacuation of 1,000 residents from the villages of 
Catcliffe, Whiston and Treeton. The Ulley dam was previously classified as Category C, but 
this incident suggests that the classification scheme needed to be reviewed. Similar 
occurrences support the need to carry out similar re-classification elsewhere.  
 
The probability of a dam failure can change for various reasons such as structural 
degradation, the impacts of climate change and land-use change. Woldemichael et al. (2012) 
discuss the changes that dam reservoirs may make to the occurrence of extreme precipitation. 
Similarly the consequences of dam failure (flooding) can change for many reasons such as 
growth in the population in areas below a dam, or perhaps because the value of property 
below the dam has increased. Consequently both the chance that a dam might fail and the 
likely consequences of that failure can change over time. 
 
 Given that individual dam failures are independent events, it is possible that more than one 
failure could happen around the same time. If there are several dams built along the same 
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river valley e.g. the Ladybower dams in the Peak District, it is conceivable that one failure 
may lead to another failure. In this case each failure becomes a dependent event. 
 
3. The statistics of concurrent risks 
Floods have the same probability of occurrence each year. A risk-based approach has largely 
replaced the traditional and potentially misleading term ‘return period’ as shown in Table 2. 
In considering concurrent risks there are various types of events that need to be defined. We 
will look at each type following Chatfield (1983), considering specific events which are 
specified as E1, E2, E3 etc. 
1. Mutually exclusive 
If two events E1 and E2 are mutually exclusive i.e. they cannot both occur, the probability that 
one of the mutually exclusive events occurs is the sum of their respective probabilities: 
                                 P(E1 + E2) = P(E1) + P(E2) 
Here P(E1 + E2) means that at least one of the events occurs. This could refer to internal dam 
erosion or very heavy rainfall. 
2. Not mutually exclusive 
Two events that are not mutually exclusive contain one or more sample points. Consider that 
internal dam erosion and very heavy rainfall do occur at the same time then, 
                                 P(E1 + E2) = P(E1) + P(E2) – P(E1E2) 
Here P(E1E2) is the probability that both E1 and E2 occur at the same time. 
3. Conditional probability 
Consider the probability of an event E1 when it is not known that E2 has occurred. In this case 
the conditional probability of E1 given that E2 has occurred is 
                                                P(E1/E2) = P(E1E2) / P(E2) 
4. Independent and dependent 
Two events E1 and E2 are said to be independent if P(E1) = P(E1|E2). When they are 
dependent then P(E1) ≠ P(E1|E2). 
5. Joint events 
The probability of a joint event (E1E2) is given by  
                                P(E1|E2) = P(E1E2) / P(E2) = P(E2) P(E1|E2) = P(E1) P(E2|E1) 
These relations apply to both dependent and independent events. However, if the events are 
independent then P(E1|E2) = P(E1) and P(E1E2) = P(E1) P(E2) 
 
If there are three events then for example 
           P(E1 + E2 + E3) = P(E1) + P(E2) + P(E3) – P(E1E2) ¬ P(E1E3) – P(E2E3) + P(E1E2E3) 
And the other equations above may be extended similarly. 
 
In assessing overall probability of failure the extent to which failure modes are dependent or 
independent of one another needs to be considered to apply the correct approach from the 
above. Events are dependent if the outcome of one event affects the outcome of another. For 
example, if one draws two coloured balls from a bag and the first ball is not replaced before 
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you draw the second ball then the outcome of the second draw will be affected by the 
outcome of the first draw. 
Where dependency is ignored the overall probability may be too high (although for dams the 
probabilities of failure are normally so small that this makes no practical difference to the 
outcome). Only the highest probability from each external threat may be considered, but for 
internal threats (from within the dam itself) all failure modes are summed as suggested by 
Defra/Ea (2013) and as shown in Table 3. 
 
In cases where several dams retain the same reservoir, but would breach into the same valley, 
the same approach should be taken in combining the likelihood of failure of the dams, in that 
only the failure mode with the highest probability for all dams from one external threat is 
included, but that all internal threats are included. 
 
The internal threats listed in Table 3 arise from structural degradation over time which may 
be enhanced by extended periods of drought. A meteorological drought is usually defined as 
an extended period of weather (usually around 3 weeks) where less than a third of the usual 
precipitation falls. Droughts are a relatively common feature of the weather in the United 
Kingdom, with one around every 5–10 years on average. These droughts are usually confined 
to summer, when a blocking high pressure system causes hot, dry weather for an extended 
period. 
A hydrological drought can occur, after a relatively dry winter whereby the soil moisture 
storage, reservoirs and water table have not risen sufficiently to counteract the warm summer 
weather. These sort of conditions can go on over several years, even with above average 
rainfall at the time as the rainfall only slowly percolates through the water stores and 
replenishes them. This may lead to degradation within earth core dams.  For example, the 16-
month England and Wales rainfall total from May 1975 to August 1976 ranks the driest in the 
near 250-year England and Wales precipitation series for any 16-month period by a 
considerable margin (Rodda and Marsh, 2011). The 2010-2012 drought in England and 
Wales was similarly extreme (Kendon et al.(2013). 
Crest and chute overtopping arise from reservoir levels being increased by extreme rainfall, 
and the occurrence of strong surface winds blowing at right angles to the dam. During the 
1987 storm over England and Wales a maximum gust of 115 mph was observed at 
Shoreham-by-sea, West Sussex with sustained average wind speeds of 50 mph. The 
maximum observed gust speed at a low level site in Scotland at Fraserburgh is 142 mph. 
 
The melting of lying snow has the potential to add to a flood produced by heavy rainfall, and 
hence increase the possibility of dam failure. The winter of 1946–1947 was one of the most 
significant winters to cause widespread flooding in the United Kingdom enhanced by a 
considerable snowmelt. Mid-March brought milder air to the country which thawed the snow 
lying on the ground. This snowmelt ran off the frozen ground straight into rivers and caused 
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the widespread flooding. The weather factors which cause melting are temperature, wind 
speed and humidity. 
 
Hough and Holliis (1997) estimated the annual maximum snow melt for periods of 3 to 168 
hours. In addition they estimated the snow melt with return periods of 5, 25 and 50 years for 
these durations, and for a snow melt of 42 mm/day which was recommended for use in 
reservoir safety design studies. Table 4 shows estimates of return period and annual 
frequency for 24 hours snow melt equal to 42 mm at various stations throughout the United 
Kingdom. Note that for some high level stations annual frequencies are quite large e.g. for 
Malham Tarn it is 0.25 and Aviemore it is 0.125, whereas for low level stations in England 
and Wales it is very low < 0.0001. 
 
Consider now the following two not mutually exclusive events: 
      E1 = 5.10
-5
 a near PMP (see Collier et al., 2010) 
      E2 = 6. 10
-4
 internal threat  
    P(E1E2) = 1.8.10
-4
 from Table 2 
Hence using the equation above for P(E1 + E2) then P = 5.10
-5
 + 6.10
-4
 – 1.8.10-4 = 4.7.10-4. 
This value for the overall likelihood of failure is about two times larger than the overall 
probability given in Table 3.  
 
Consider a near PMP rainfall event occurring at the same time as a snow melt of 42 mm/day, 
then at a high level station such as Malham Tarn the annual probability of failure for a joint 
event would be P(E1|E2) = P(E1E2) / P(E2) where E1 = 10
-4
 / 0.25 = 4.10
-4
. This is about 
twice the probability of the overall probability of failure given in Table 3.  
 
4. Numerical modelling 
Although the statistical approach does provide a useful insight into the probability of a dam 
failure, the use of an atmospheric numerical model can provide information on the probability 
of how physical processes might interact leading to dangerous conditions. We describe next 
the use of such models. 
Collier and Hardaker (1996) describe a method of estimating PMP based upon a simple storm 
model. The model uses a parameter storm efficiency (E), which is the ratio of the total 
rainfall at the ground (cell-relative) to the amount of precipitable water (total cloud water 
condensed) in the representative air column during the storm. It is assumed that the air mass 
is saturated and the vertical humidity profile is represented by the dew-point temperature at 
the surface following the saturated pseudo-adiabatic lapse rate. The UK Flood Studies Reprt 
(FSA) describes the process of determining the storm efficiency. One problem with 
estimating E is that a good estimate of the dew-point temperature is needed. A more 
comprehensive numerical model is required than are represented in the simple model in order 
to investigate the impact of low-level convergence and increased understanding of storm 
microphysics and dynamics. This should lead to the definition of which factors are more 
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important in producing heavy rainfall, and therefore improvements in techniques of 
estimating PMP.  
The Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) Model is a next-generation mesoscale 
numerical weather prediction system designed to serve both atmospheric research and 
operational forecasting needs. It features two dynamical cores, a data assimilation system, 
and a software architecture allowing for parallel computation and system extensibility. The 
model serves a wide range of meteorological applications across scales ranging from meters 
to thousands of kilometres. The effort to develop WRF began in the latter part of the 1990's 
and was a collaborative partnership principally among the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research (NCAR), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (represented by 
the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) and the (then) Forecast Systems 
Laboratory (FSL)), the Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA), the Naval Research Laboratory, 
the University of Oklahoma, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
WRF allows researchers the ability to produce simulations reflecting either real data or 
observations, analyses) or idealized atmospheric conditions. The model physics is numerical  
code describing those processes (Table 5) not explicitly included in the basic dynamical and 
thermodynamical equations describing the earth's atmosphere. These processes are either too 
complicated to be explicitly included in the model based on their most fundamental physics  
laws (e.g. radiation and microphysics), or finer in scale than can be adequately represented by 
realizable grid resolutions (sub-grid scale turbulence, PBL transport).  Yet, their effects on 
the resolvable scale flows and on the sensible weather (e.g., precipitation amount) have to be 
properly included for a model to accurately predict atmospheric behaviour for NWP 
purposes.  Simplifications are typically made and variables (parameters) on the resolvable 
scales are often used in treating these processes; the resulting schemes are usually referred to 
as physics parameterizations.   
To investigate the rainfall, which occurred on the 19
th
 June 2005 in North Yorkshire, three 
nested WRF numerical model domains over Northern England were used as follows: 
D03 dx = 300 m 240 km square (about 800 x 800 grid points) 
D02 dx = 1500 m 750 km square (about 500 x 500 grid points) 
D01 dx = 7500 m 3750 km square (about 500 x 500 grid points) 
 
At least 101 levels in the vertical were used. Convective parameterization were turned off 
except for the outer domain (D01). A series of experiments have been carried out to 
investigate the impact of changes to the model microphysical schemes, low-level 
convergence and orographic resolution. The microphysical schemes represent cloud and 
precipitation processes, and therefore of direct relevance to PMP. Further details of the 
microphysics schemes are given in Skamarock et al. (2008). Table 6 shows the different 
microphysical schemes tested. It was found that the WDM6 scheme produced the best results. 
In addition, planetary boundary layer wind convergence induced by atmospheric system 
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dynamics and local orography is also of central importance. Comparing the rainfall generated 
by these processes with what actually occurred, it was found that about 50% of the rain 
resulted from the optimum choice of microphysical scheme, whereas 25% arose from using 
high resolution orography (50 m).       
 
In Fig 3(b), neither the Thompson nor the Millbrandt scheme produced rainfall in this 
catchment region (cf. Figure 2). The Lin scheme produced a modest amount of rain (10mm); 
the Morrison scheme produced 30mm of rain and the WDM6 scheme exceeded 40mm. Note 
that the Morrison and WDM6 schemes forecast the location of the rainfall maximum very 
well (the latter scheme in particular), although the predicted amounts are far less those 
observed.  
This shows (i) the sensitivity of NWP models to choice of microphysics scheme and (ii) that 
with a carefully chosen scheme the NWP model can, in fact, predict the correct location of 
intense rainfall. This suggests that a probability-based model using the information on failure 
modes discussed in section 3 could embrace the WRF model to assess the probability of a 
near PMP event. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Further work needs to be undertaken here, but it would appear that concurrent events can 
significantly increase the chances of failure. A probability-based model would appear to the 
way forward to assess the likelihood of current dam failure modes. 
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Table 1 
 
Dam category Potential consequence of reservoir failure 
A At least 10 lives at risk and extensive property damage 
B Fewer than 10 lives at risk or extensive property damage 
C Negligible risk to human life, but some property damage 
D Negligible risk to human life and very limited property damage 
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Table 2 
 
Annual probability (%) Annual chance 
0.1 1 in 10 (E-1 ) 
0.01 1 in 100 (E-2) 
0.001 1 in 1000 (E-3) 
0.0001 1 in 10,000 (E-4) 
0.00001 1 in100,000 (E-5) 
0.000001 1 in 1,000,000 
(E-6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Threat Progression (failure 
mode) 
Likelihood of 
failure for 
independent 
FM 
Considered for overall probability 
Floods  Crest overtopping 5E-6 5E-5 Take highest for each 
external threat  Chute overtopping 5E-5 
Internal 
Threats 
Body of dam 6E-4 6E-4 Include all failure modes 
for internal threats 
 Foundation 6E-6 6E-6 
 Interface between structure 
and embankment 
6E-5 6E-5 
Overall likelihood of failure 1.8E-4 1.8E-4  
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Table 4 
 
Station T Frequency Station T Frequency 
Lerwick 102 0.0098 Wick 102 0.0098 
Aviemore 8 0.125 Abbotsinch 10,000 0.0001 
Leeming/Dishforth 890 0.0011 Manchester 10,000 0.0001 
Elmdon 10,000 0.0001 Honington/Mildenhall 10,000 0.0001 
Doscombe Down 7,900 0.0012 Plymouth 10,000 0.0001 
Valley 10,000 0.0001 Aldergrove 10,000 0.0001 
Redesdale 84 0.0119 Moor House 4 0.25 
Malham Tarn 4 0.25 Wilsden 29 0.0345 
Cwmystwyth 80 0.0125 Widdybank Fell 2 0.5 
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Table 5 
 
 
 
  Physical processes incorporated into WRF. 
* Generation of PBL turbulence and related 
transports (including non-local effects but 
essentially dry surface-based processes.) 
* Surface-atmosphere exchanges momentum, 
heat, moisture, might eventually include other 
quantities, either land or water surfaces) 
including dependencies on surface and 
subsurface processes. 
* Generation of subgrid-scale turbulence and 
related transports above the PBL (resulting in 
primarily local diffusion) 
*Convection (non-local fluxes aided by 
condensation, including "shallow" 
convection) 
* Radiation (short and long wave, 
atmospheric and surface effects) 
* Cloud and precipitation physics (local 
processes including fallout) 
 
Table 6 
MP Physics Scheme 
8 (/98) Thompson (old) 
9 Milbrandt 2 - moments 
10 Morrison 2 - moments 
16 WDM6 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1: (a) Distribution of Category A (red) and B (yellow) dams; (b) an example of the 
area likely to be flooded should dams fail near Pontefract, Yorkshire; note the route of the 
M62 motorway running west to east and the A1(T) running north to south (courtesy 
Environment Agency. 
 
Figure 2: Rainfall  19
th
 June 2005 in the area of the Boltby reservoir, 125 mm in 3 hours. 
Also shown is the orography (from Wass et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 3: Accumulated WRF rainfall 12-18Z 19 June 2005 using (a) Lin, (b) Thompson or 
Millbrandt, (c) Morrison, (d) WDM6 microphysics schemes and (e) certain “features” have 
been added so that comparison can be made with Fig. 2. Topography is colour shaded in 
metres. Rainfall contour interval in (a) to (d) is 10mm. 
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